Since the launch of economic reform in 1978, China's economic system has moved from a centrally planned economy to a market oriented economy, and China's economic reform has been generally accepted as successful as represented by an average GDP growth rate of 9.8% per year for two decades. But despite the success of its rural reform and the rapid growth of non-state sectors, the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has proved to be much more difficult.
The policies of the SOE reform in the 1980's and early 1990's revitalized the SOEs through a process of decentralization, improvement of internal management, and incentive mechanisms.
Most empirical studies have proved that there was an improvement in productivity as represented by total factor productivity (Chen et al., 1988; Jefferson et al., 1992; World bank, 1992; Groves et al., 1994; Gordon and Li, 1995; Li, 1997) , even if the productivity growth was comparatively lower than non-SOEs, but the low profitability of SOEs has not yet been resolved.
In fact their profitability has become worse. In 1997, among the 22,000 large and medium size SOEs, 6,599 firms reported negative profits. The low profitability of SOEs was regarded as such a serious problem that it could hurt China's continual economic growth; therefore, the Chinese government has given priority to further reform of the low profitability of SOEs.
Especially since the bolstering of SOEs reform in 1998, the Chinese government has speed up the resolution of the low efficiency and low profitability of SOEs; the main factors of which are a high liability-asset ratio, a low technological level, over-employment and their poor management. The measures of latest SOEs reform are essentially different from the earlier periods. In 1998, Premier Zhu Rongji put China's loss making SOEs on a strict three-year schedule during which they were to convert losses to surpluses. The main policy of the threeyear schedule was to "retain the larges and release the smalls." That is, smaller scale SOEs were permitted to sell themselves outright via merges, acquisition and the conversion of ownership status, but the reform focused on larger SOEs. They were forced to convert to a corporate management scheme, the so called "modern enterprise system," and the SOEs were given more favorable measures to resolve their low profitability, such as reducing liability-asset ratio using debt-equity swap, reducing and rolling-over their interest payments and supporting a technological progress fund, and speeding up workers layoff (xiagang). By 1999, the Chinese government was handling huge amounts of bad loans from the four state-owned commercial banks by establishing four asset management companies (AMC). The total amount of bad loans disposed by the AMCs was 1393.9 billion yuan, and most of these bad loans were issued to SOEs. After their purchase, the bad loans were rearranged through debt-equity swaps, writing off debt, and the reduction of interest payments.
The effects of ownership structure on corporate performance in Chinese enterprises have been widely studied. Zhang (1997) argues that the reform of SOEs has not been very successful, at least in terms of profit rate measures. From a data sample of 2000 companies in Shanghai from 1996 -1998 , Zhang and Zhang (2001 suggest that the non-SOEs have a higher average level of productivity than SOEs and that ownership appears to be a more significant determinant of efficiency than intra-industry competition. They also found that SOEs have a higher rate of efficiency improvement than non-SOEs, but due to an information asymmetry and a high monitoring cost, managers may have reduced the profit submitted to the state by overstating costs and understating revenues. Qi et al (2000) , using a data set of firms in the Shanghai Stock
Exchanges from 1991 to 1996, argue that firm performance, as measured by ROE, decreases in proportion to state shares, but increases in proportion to legal entity shares, after controlling for size, leverage, industry, and the macroeconomic environment.
This paper investigates the effects of corporate reform, which has been reinforced since the end of the 1990's, on the profitability of China's SOEs as compared with the other form of ownership, and the effects on the failed companies, so called Special Treatment (ST) and Particular Transfer (PT) firms. Because of the difficulty in data collection, this paper focuses on listed firms and uses their annual accounting reports. In this paper, to study the changes in profitability among the different enterprise ownership forms listed firms are classified into three groups, SOEs, partial-SOEs, non-SOEs. We will evaluate the effects of corporate reform, focusing especially on large SOEs since late 1990s.
Since 1998 the Chinese stock market has introduced ST and PT provisions because of business failures in order to protect stock market investors. Considering there were few defaulting firms among Chinese firms, especially among the large SOEs, we take it for granted that ST and PT companies are defaulting firms. Because the ownership of most ST and PT companies were changed, it is not unreasonable to assume that ST and PT firms are in default.
For ST and PT firms, we investigate the existence of change in profitability and corporate structure, and then use a probit model to estimate the major factors influencing ST and PT business failures. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data set used in this paper, and summarizes the time trend, gap of profitability and the business activity related indicators among companies under different forms of ownership; Section 3 studies the failed companies, also called ST and PT companies on the Chinese stock market, and focuses on the effect of corporate restructuring; Section 4 reports the empirical results of a probit model analysis of business failure related indicators; Section 5 contains our concluding remarks.
Ownership structure and profitability of listed firms

data
The data set used in this paper includes all the firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen AStock markets. The data were obtained from individual firm's annual accounting reports. It covers all balance sheet and income sheet items, and the number of stocks shared by different kinds of owners.
To study the effect of ownership, companies are grouped by their ratio of state-owned shares to total stock volume. We define an SOE as a company whose ratio of state-owned shares is above 20%, non-state enterprise are those companies who have a ratio of 0%. Partially stateowned enterprises are defined as those companies who have a ratio of between 0% and 20% state-owned shares. Considering that only about 35% of stocks are tradable, state ownership ratios above 20% are enough to control a firm's ownership, but it is not clear whether firms with ratios of 0% to 20% are state or legal entity owned. 
Informal Analysis
Through analysis of time trend summaries of profitability, debt ratio, costs, and business activity related indices, we can descriptively investigate changes of Chinese companies' corporate performance. We can also evaluate the consequence of China's SOEs reform and especially the effects after its reinforcement in 1998.
China's SOEs were commonly perceived as performing poorly. And it is also well known that the poor corporate performance of SOEs was mostly due to an incomplete incentive mechanism, higher costs from higher debt-ratios, over-capacity, and over-employment. We focused on the relative changes in business-related indicators between SOEs and non-SOEs.
The time trends of different forms of enterprise ownership are explained as follows.
Asset Size:
The asset size of SOEs is larger than the other enterprise ownership types, and this fact is easily understood because SOEs are historically old and mostly placed in heavy industry.
Measured on the bases of asset size, non-SOEs are smallest. The size of companies under different ownership types is growing continually (table 1). Second, in the period of drastic macroeconomic downturn, SOEs' performance drop was less severe than the other forms of company ownership. In 2001, 147 of 1126 companies had a negative net profit, and the average level of ROA and ROE are both negative, which means that companies listed in the Chinese stock market on average had negative profit. But comparatively SOEs' profit drop is not so serious. This phenomenon could be explained by three factors: first, the SOEs' reform, which resulted in profitability enhancement relative to non-SOEs since the reinforcement of SOEs reform in 1998; second, industry factors placed SOEs in comparatively recession-free industries; last, SOEs are government subsidized, while the non-SOEs are not. Note: ROA 1 = Net profit/ total asset, ROA 2 = (total profit + financial cost)/ total asset, ROE = net profit/equity Graph 1: Time trend of ROA
Debt ratio:
The debt ratios of SOEs was higher than non-SOEs in most periods. But the debt ratio between SOEs and non-SOEs has reversed since 1999 (table 3, graph 2). Considering that there was a macroeconomic downturn, it is interesting that the SOEs' debt ratio did not change, and the debt ratios of partial-SOEs and non-SOEs obviously increased. There could be some reasons for the relative improvement of the SOEs' debt ratios as compared with the other forms of ownership: first, the reinforcement of the SOEs' reform since 1998, placed stronger constraints on the financing of SOEs' debt; second, at the period of the macroeconomic downturn, firms generally tend to externalize their business risk, and non-SOEs externalized their risk to a greater extent at this time than SOEs. Chinese SOEs have always tended to externalize risk regardless of the macroeconomic situation, so by the time of the economic downturn, the SOEs had little room to further externalize risk. The comparative improvement in SOEs debt ratios was also reflected in their declining financial costs relative to the other forms of firm ownership, and this decline in financial cost could be one factor improving the profitability of SOEs. 
Liquidity ratio:
We can also find evidence of SOEs relatively enhanced asset-liability structure in changes in liquidity ratios. A liquidity ratio is a measure of the total current asset to the total current liability, or by ratio of money fund to total current liability. In most periods, non-SOEs' liquidity ratios were higher than that of SOEs', but in 2000, the liquidity ratio between SOEs and nonSOEs was reversed (table 4, graph3). Note: L1 = Total current asset/ total current liability, L2 = Money fund/ total current liability Graph3: Liquidity ratio
Business activity:
In contrast to profitability, the business activity of SOEs, as measured by asset turn-over rates (revenue/total asset) and inventory turn-over rates, was higher than non-SOEs in every period (table 5, graph 4). This means that SOEs were selling well in comparison with non-SOEs.
It is also an interesting phenomenon that SOEs were doing well in their business, but had low profitability. We could find the main reason for this phenomenon from the fact that the relative costs of SOEs were higher than non-SOEs. Graph 4: Asset turn-over rate
Cost:
In terms of cost, SOEs were not better than their competitors, non-SOEs. But the ratio of the sum of all costs to total assets converged (table 6, graph 5). We suggest that the SOEs' reform reduced costs for the SOEs, but the different kinds of cost have a different time trend. First, for the cost of main operation, SOEs' are still higher than non-SOEs in every period, but their gap has been remarkably reduced from 1996-1998, which could mainly stem from the labor lay-off called "xiagang" (graph 6). 2 But SOEs still have an inefficient cost structure when compared to non-SOEs. Second, the ratios of sum of financial costs, selling costs, general management costs, and other costs to total assets also remarkably improved. Moreover, the ratio of these kinds of costs between SOEs and non-SOEs reversed. From this fact, we suggest that the reinforcement of the corporate restructuring plan was successful. C2  C3  C1  C2  C3  C1  C2  C3  C1  C2  C3  1995 
ST and PT Companies
It is difficult to study defaulting companies because there have been only a few companies which have defaulted and exited from the Chinese stock market. Therefore, we have defined ST (Special Treatment), and PT (Particular Transfer) companies as failed businesses, and then evaluated their corporate restructuring.
Since 1998, ST and PT companies have been reported by the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock
Exchanges. The purpose of such reporting has been to protect stock investors.
The conditions for ST companies are negative net profit in two consecutive accounting years or net asset per stock ratio is below one yuan. The condition for PT companies is negative net profit in three consecutive accounting years. The range of fluctuation for ST stock process is restricted that to no more than 5% in one day. The stocks of PT companies are traded on a restricted basis, such as only one day per week.
In analysis of the changes after a company has been reported to be an ST or PT company, we find that the restructuring of ST companies has not been so successful (table 9 ). In 1998, 27 companies were specified ST, but only 4 companies exited from ST status, and 15 of the 27 companies still remained. In 1999, 10 of the 41 ST companies exited from ST status. This phenomenon strongly suggests that the corporate restructuring of company failures in the Chinese stock market has not been successful. In analysis of the changes in ownership, we find that most of the ST companies have changes in ownership, which means that there has, at least to some extent, been a corporate restructuring, but in most of the ST companies the change in ownership did not take effect immediately: it takes more than 2-3 years from the time the ST reports a change (table 11, table   12 ). The profitability of ST and PT companies improved, but it was not so eminently changed that they could escape from business failure status. The debt ratio of ST companies was even higher than before. Note : Debt ratio = (total liability/total asset) C1 = (cost of main operation /total asset) C2 = (financial cost/total asset) C2 = (cash paid for employee/total asset) O1 = Asset turn-over rate = (revenue/total asset) O2 = Inventory turn-over rate = (average inventory/total asset) 
Empirical Results of Default Risk Analysis
The purpose of our empirical test was to investigate the determinants of business failure, that is to say, the main factors of business failure ex ante.
The basic model for estimating the business failure rate of firms is specified in the following multivariate probit panel model.
Where ST i, t+1 indicates whether a firm i is reported as an ST company in t+1. The basic idea of the empirical test is that the occurrence of ST companies can be estimated by information available in the prior year.
A sample of 708 firms was included in this empirical test, and each of the firms was listed in 1997 and survived until 2001. We introduced two dummy variables, an SOE dummy and an asset size dummy to control for their effect on ST and PT provision. The firms are divided into two groups by the asset size dummy. Large firms are defined as having total assets over 1 billion yuan in value. The probit model estimate was constructed using variables that can reflect the various aspects that influence profitability, such as, the debt ratio, financial cost, size, ownership type, cash flow, the business activity ratio, etc.
The empirical results of the probit model are as follows: the state dummy and size dummy have (-) coefficients and are significant at the 1% significance level. The (-) coefficient of the state dummy and the size dummy means that the state-owned companies and the large companies are not easily found to be in default, as compared with other forms of company ownership or smaller firms. The short-term debt ratio and the financial cost ratio have the correct sign of (+) coefficients, which means that the higher the short-term debt ratio and the financial cost ratio, the greater the default risk of the company. 
